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BOOK REVIEW 
LAND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITS OF PLAN-
NING, by Joseph F. DiMento; Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Pub-
lishers, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, Pp. 165. 
Reviewed by Charles C. Humpstone* 
This book is a rewarding exploration of a longstanding controversy 
over how best to govern the competing preferences of land-use plan-
ners on one hand and private real estate developers on the other. 
Even if one is biased against planners and planning, one comes away 
enlightened if not dissuaded. 
Professor DiMento likes quotations. He introduces his book, and 
point of view, with: 
A plan without an ordinance to follow is like a bow without an ar-
row. Longswamp, T.P. v. Planning Commission of Berks County, 
65 Berks 69, 72.1 
and one of the themes he will explore with: 
It is a matter of common sense and reality that a comprehensive 
plan is not like the law of the Medes and the Persians; it must be 
subject to reasonable change from time to time as conditions 
. . . change. Furniss v. Township of Lower Merion, 412 Pa. 
404, 194 A.2d 927, 928.2 
To the author's quotes, this reviewer would add another, summariz-
ing the consistency controversy: 
One man's Mede is another man's Persian. George S. Kaufman 
* President, Environmental Risk Assessment Service (USA) Boston, Massachusetts; A.B., 
Harvard College, 1953; LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1959; Member, New York Bar. 
1. J. DIMENTO, THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITS OF PLANNING xiii (1980). 
2. Id. at 1. 
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The Consistency Doctrine is an extraordinary achievement. Read 
narrowly, it is a presentation of the arguments in favor of, and 
against, requiring that the administration of local zoning ordinances 
conform to ("be consistent with" hence "consistency") the re-
quirements imposed by long-range comprehensive land-use plans. 
This controversy has intensified with the passage of time as many 
states, including California, Kentucky, Nebraska, Florida, New 
Jersey, and Minnesota, have enacted statutory requirements for con-
sistency, while other states, including Washington, Vermont, 
Arizona, Maine, and Indiana, have encouraged movement toward 
consistency. 
Read more broadly, The Consistency Doctrine presents larger 
issues: contests between collective order and individual. freedom; 
between common benefit and private gain; between administrative 
predestination and legislative free will. Almost in passing it also pro-
vides, for those of us not drawn into direct contact with land-use 
planners, an introduction to planners as a group. A quoted passage 
from Article IX, Code of Professional Responsibility of the Canons of 
the American Institute of Planners, gives a first glimpse of the dizzy-
ing heights from which planners look down upon the members of the 
Boards of Supervisors or Zoning Boards whom they serve: 
1.1(a) A planner serves the public interest primarily. He shall ac-
cept or continue employment only when he can insure accom-
modations of the client's or employer's interest with the public 
interest. 
(b) A planner shall seek to expand choice and opportunity for 
all persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the 
needs of disadvantaged groups and persons and shall urge the 
alteration of policies, institutions and decisions which militate 
against such objectives.3 
This glimpse is our first view of a group of the major themes of The 
Consistency Doctrine. 
Who is "the public?" What are its interests, needs, and desires? 
Who can best identify these, present them, or balance them against 
one another when they are multiple and conflicting? In the end, are 
controlling land-use decisions best made by civil servants or by local 
elected officials? The Consistency Doctrine raises these issues and a 
score of related ones, some of constitutional dimensions, e.g., the re-
lationship of government regulation to private ownership of land. 
Some of its questioning of the process of planning touches on 
broader questions affecting any planning-What can be known about 
3. [d. at 47. 
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the future? Is it more prudent to follow a plan based on preconceived 
notions of the unknown or to be guided by the available knowledge of 
the present? The book does not seek to answer directly. Instead, it 
presents the arguments on each issue dispassionately, sympathetic-
ally, in a text which is simply written but accompanied by profuse 
citations. 
Professor DiMento is at his very best in the presentation of pros 
and cons. Chapter Three, which will be discussed below in some 
detail, is a model for summation of the merits of opposing views. 
Perhaps its balance betrays more than the author's instinct for 
fairness. In his Epilogue, he suggests that the act of formulating his 
expression of the arguments in the consistency debate may have 
caused him to change his mind about their relative merits not once 
but several times. 
Is a consistency doctrine advisable? In this Epilogue I present 
my evolving views on whether a state or local government 
should adopt the consistency doctrine and on the nature of the 
requirement. The views remain tentative. Conceptualizing, 
researching, and writing The Consistency Doctrine involved fre-
quent vacillation in the status I would attribute to planning.4 
Professor DiMento goes on to admit, for the first time explicitly, 
that in the end, he sides with the planners. Whether or not one 
agrees with his conclusion, one cannot help but admire the way he 
reaches it. 
His steps are worth retracing. The opening chapter announces the 
increasing tendency among legislatures and courts to require con-
sistency. It retraces the evolution of the consistency requirement 
since 1922, noting ambiguity in both statutory and judicial 
statements of the requirement and in policy debates over "both the 
feasibility and advisability of a strong planning function."5 
The author then examines the variations among state and federal 
statutes that impose consistency requirements and describes the ex-
tent to which judicial decisions contradict one another. He considers 
the legal implications of a series of variables. For example, the time 
allowed for achieving consistency changes the nature of the require-
ment itself. Remedies are a special concern. A court may invalidate a 
non-conforming zoning decision, but most are reluctant to do so. In 
California alone: "Remedies range from giving local governments 
extensions of time to meet the state's plan adoption deadlines to en-
joining the issuance of building permits or setting aside of a subdivi-
4. [do at 1400 
50 [do at 30 
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sion approval until an adequate general plan has been adopted."6 Ad-
ministrative remedies may range from carrots, in the form of sup-
plemental planning grant awards, to such sticks as state preemption 
of development regulations. In general, Professor DiMento con-
cludes that administrative enforcement will fail unless reinforced by 
the availability of injunctive relief to both private litigants and to the 
state planning agency. 
Maya change in planned land use affect the value of the property 
to the extent that it constitutes a "taking" for which the owner must 
be reimbursed? The answer on the whole has been that there is no 
"taking" unless the change "deprives a property owner of substan-
tially all use of his property."7 The consistency doctrine does not yet 
seem to change this although courts in the past, in finding that 
changes in plans were not "takings," have sometimes based their 
conclusions on assertions that plans are only tentative and advisory. 
This book voices a hope that courts confronting the stronger relation-
ships between plans and zoning will, nevertheless, continue to find 
no unconstitutional "taking" unless substantially all value is 
destroyed. 
A special peril to the consistency requirement is posed by "spot 
planning," a tempting procedural gambit for the developer who has 
been denied a zoning change by operation of the requirement. 
Although a local government subject to consistency requirements 
may be bound both to create a general plan and then to follow it in 
making its zoning decisions, it also enjoys considerable flexibility in 
writing and amending the original plan. The developer who initially 
is prevented from pursuing a non-conforming activity on his site due 
to the decision of a zoning board which is obedient to a restrictive 
general plan, may use his influence on the local government to obtain 
an amendment to the general plan which reclassifies his property. 
He may then return to the zoning board, this time using the con-
sistency doctrine to compel the sought-after zoning change. Califor-
nia, Oregon, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania have attempted 
legislatively to prevent such spot planning with varying success. 
Professor DiMento's Chapter Three, "The Consistency Debate," is 
his best. He presents the arguments first for, and then against, land-
use planning in general and the consistency requirement in par-
ticular. He appears not as advocate, but as intermediary, quoting, 
paraphrasing, or characterizing, the assertions made by others. It is 
not only by inference that these arguments may be read as touching 
6. Id. at 24. 
7. Id. at 27 (emphasis in original). 
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on a much wider range of controversies than those involving zoning 
variances. His preface invites such a reading: 
The Consisten<1J Doctrine may be read narrowly. As such, it is 
applicable to the question of whether local planning should be re-
quired and translated into local zoning and other development 
regulations. However, several sections generalize to a much 
broader concern, that of the function of planning in acceptable 
regulation by modern government. An aim of the present work 
is to use the consistency doctrine as a vehicle to advance discus-
sion of the broader debate.s 
The argument in favor of planning is summarized below with less 
felicity, and, a perceptive reader will suspect, less enthusiasm, than 
in the original. 
First, planning is necessary for rational development and pro-
motes "more desirable futures than nonplanning."9 Planners are 
getting better at their work. They can analyze large bodies of data so 
as to present rational choices among alternatives. Planning without 
a consistency requirement is ineffective. Planning's past failures 
have resulted from a lack of a consistency doctrine. Second, a series 
of fundamental questions must be addressed. "What means will 
most equitably and efficiently allocate societal goods?"lO Should 
development decisions be under the control "of those persons who 
have substantial economic interests in their outcomes?"l1 How, and 
by whom, is the public interest best defined? 
From the planners' viewpoint, interests are best identified by in-
terest groups. These should be represented and their requirements 
heard. However, allocation of resources among these groups should 
be based on forecasts and data analysis not available to, or 
understood by laymen. In each of these arguments the author 
assigns to the planning process the implied competence to carry 
heavy responsibility. Each time he does so, the author steps back to 
question the implication. Why are planners better suited than local 
legislatures to resolve the differences among the competing groups? 
Because, he reasons, the planners' training emphasizes "optimiza-
tion under constraints." They are trained to seek out the interest of 
the whole public rather than the single issue group. "Planners tend 
to be more socialistic in their attitudes toward use of resources than 
8. [d. at xvi. 
9. [d. at 45. 
10. [d. at 46. 
11. [d. 
756 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:751 
are other groups strongly interested in the outcomes of planning and 
land use control processes."12 This last statement will not win 
debating points in front of all audiences. It is, however, a fair charac-
terization of the attitude expressed in the earlier quotation from the 
Canons of the American Institute of Planners. 
Finally, the consistency requirement would remove the present op-
portunities for the most influential forces in the community to co-opt 
the planners in such a way that the planners' supposed quantitative, 
"value-free," work product conceals a bias in favor of the 
developers. By forcing more public participation at the planning 
stage, the consistency requirement would restore the balance among 
the planners' sources of information. 
Here and there in his presentation of the case for planning, signs 
of Professor DiMento's underlying enthusiasm for the planning proc-
ess appe~r, if only implicitly. Surprisingly, then, when he turns to 
the case against planning, his presentation becomes more per-
suasive. An adversary to planning might point out, with some relish, 
that the advocate's job becomes easier here because the arguments 
against planning are inherently stronger than those in its favor. A 
more impartial critic must feel some admiration for the precision and 
eloquence with which the author reveals the shortcomings of the 
position for which he is later to admit his support. 
Even his quotations get more lively: 
Control of land use and development through public planning 
and regulation is akin to performing surgery by a team con-
sisting of faith healers, exorcists and surgeons. While the pa-
tient may not die instantly, he may well wish he had. ls 
American political attitudes do not lend themselves to mixing up 
property values with moral tracts. As an exhortative force in 
community life, comprehensive planning as it has been practiced 
is a failure. And as an effective interventionist with the price 
mechanisms of the market place, it does not begin to have the 
leverage possible in the political systems of Europe and 
Russia. l4 
Consistency is a bad idea because planning is just not done well. It 
is "costly," "conservative," "noninventive," "highly subjective," 
"pedestrian." Planners are incompetent. 
12. [d. at 47. 
13. Seigan, Controlling Other People's Property Through Covenants, Zoning, State and 
Federal Regulations, 5 ENVT'L 1.. 385, 401 n.17 (1975). 
14. Perin, A Noiseless Secession from the Comprehensive Plan, 33 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 
336, 342 n.10 (1976). 
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Planners are naive and fail to understand that where conflict is 
real, consensus is impossible. They do not understand the highly 
political values that control local government actions. "The very no-
tion that allocations of immensely valuable land uses can be made in 
long-range plans reflecting a modicum of technical expertise, 'uto-
pian' values, and nonrepresentative citizen sentiment is naive."15 
More important, long-range planning can never be done well 
because the shape of the remote future is beyond our ability to 
forecast, always inchoate, because there can be no permanent resolu-
tion of the continuing conflicts within society, and because attempts 
to characterize a consistent set of community goals must either fail 
by reason of the internal conflicts or produce only a compendium of 
generalities too vague to serve as a basis for any action. Planning, in 
short, must be incremental. In its extreme version the argument is: 
"Solutions will be found and their arrival is hastened by unfettered 
market processes."16 A less extreme view is that planners can serve 
some useful function by assembling forecasts of information on an-
ticipated regional change. Although this information should be 
available as a resource to local governments, it should not dictate 
their choices. 
Planning as a process excludes the public from participating in 
government by taking major choices out of the hands of their elected 
representatives. Attempts by planners to select individuals or organ-
izations to represent alternative viewpoints are arbitrary and inef-
fective. 
A strict consistency requirement removing the power of choice 
from local elected officials raises constitutional issues. Local govern-
ments lack the time and information to address all the issues posed 
by an initial plan at the time it is first offered for approval. Since 
they enact it originally, the plan should not have the force to tie their 
hands so as to prevent major changes when they address specific 
issues. Against this defense of home rule, the planners are really 
arguing that home rule is bad because it is exclusionary, parochial, 
and myopic. 
After having presented both sides of the debate so well, Professor 
DiMento attempts, unsuccessfully, to decide the controversy by 
weighing the merits on each side. His evaluation fails, not because 
the scales are so evenly balanced, but because he attempts actual 
15. J. DIMENTO, THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITS OF PLANNING 49 (1980). 
16. Seigan, Controlling Other People's Property Through Covenants, Zoning, State and 
Federal Regulations, 5 ENVT'L L. 385, 396 (1975). 
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measurement of the comparative merits using a method derived 
from sociology, expressive of social scientists' desires to mimic the 
utility of quantitative measurement in physical sciences. 
In a single table he lists the assumptions favoring and opposing 
consistency requirementsY Next to each assumption he lists the 
areas of research or academic disciplines through which the assump-
tion might be evaluated. In a final column he characterizes the extent 
to which the assumption is supported, explaining, "[t]he scale 
employed is little support, moderate support, considerable support; 
it is based upon the author's assessment of the literature."18 The 
table is intended to summarize "the consistency debate in a way that 
allows social scientific analysis of proposed changes in planning 
law."19 In deciding the extent to which the assumption is supported, 
he, instead, recapitulates the arguments for and against each and in-
serts his own choice, whether an argument is persuasive or unper-
suasive, as a measurement of value. So, a pro-consistency assump-
tion, that planners are capable of identifying community objectives, 
is deemed to be "moderately" supported because survey research 
and community workshops have been used to evaluate various forms 
of support for various formulations of community values. On other 
assumptions, he lists studies supporting one side of an issue and 
those opposing it, and apparently decides the extent to which the 
assumption is "supported" by the relative numbers of the research 
papers or articles favoring and opposing it. His conclusion to this 
evaluation of the opposing views, quantitative or not, is: that no 
clearly persuasive side emerges in the consistency debate. 
While this evaluation procedure seems an exercise in self-delusion, 
the summarized arguments are, again, informative and fair. One 
longs to relieve Professor DiMento of his misplaced affection for 
"social scientific analysis," but it has not dimmed his insights into 
the intractability of the conflicting forces he observes. 
Against this background of unresolved conflict, Professor DiMen-
to offers a collection of alternatives, some, perhaps all, compatible 
with one another; some compatible with consistency, some not. 
Don't force planning upon the community. Let planning increase in 
states as planning improves and public understanding of it increases. 
Scrap general zoning and compulsory consistency and use the plan to 
supplement other sources of information while making case-by-case 
17. J. DIMENTO, THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITS OF PLANNING 74·77 (1980). 
18. [d. at 77. 
19. [d. at 73. 
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decisions. Reform the process by which land use planning is done by 
procedural reforms that reduce the incidence of graft, conflicts of in-
terest, and ex parte discussions. Improve the quality of advocacy 
representing different interests in resolving land use planning and 
zoning conflicts. Involve the community more in the planning proc-
ess so that the involvement educates the community. Improve the 
quality of planning itself; make planners more professional, better 
paid, and improve the evaluation procedures for testing results. 
Segregate consistency requirements into two tiers, detailed, near-
term action to be subject to a degree of consistency with a previously 
accepted plan, and long-term decisions to be unfettered by existing 
formulations. 
In his concluding recommendations, Professor DiMento presents a 
series of suggestions to the advocate of consistency. Don't rush into 
it. Adopt a two-tiered approach. Decide what the functions of ad-
ministrative agencies and private citizens will be. Determine the ex-
tent to which private litigation will be used as an enforcement 
mechanism. Plan a strong state compliance program. Define con-
sistency with more precision. Decide what it shall apply to, and 
whether it will be a set of map designations or of policies. Decide 
whether planning will be state subsidized. Be flexible in implementa-
tion when consistency conflicts with other state goals. 
The author concludes his epilogue with a flat assertion: "Plans that 
reflect responsible and knowledgeable participation, that are 
assembled by those who are committed to increasing the predictabili-
ty and fairness of decisions, that are technically informed, and that 
balance the interest of all those groups who would be involved 
deserve to be translated into regulations-official development con-
trols."20 
This reader of The Consistency Doctrine may still ask "Why?"; he 
may wonder whether anything has changed to make the future more 
predictable, or civil servants better able to weigh competing in-
terests or more appropriate representatives of the public interest 
than elected officials, but he does so with considerable deference to 
the knowledge and balanced judgment that have brought Professor 
DiMento to his conclusion. 
20. [d. at 147. 
